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The use of retinal biometric identifiers as security
devices in shipboard applications was investigated with the
use of the DOT 7.5(new version) and DAISY 7. 5( old version)
scanners of the Eye-Dentify Co. of Beaverton, Oregon. Motion
testing was the primary purpose of the thesis. It was the
first occurance of dynamic testing on any type of retinal
pattern recognition device. A transverse motion(only)
simulator that could roll up to fourteen degrees and sustain
a cycle per minute(cpm) rate of 6.0 was constructed and
utilized. The nature of the experiment was to test the two
scanners to determine if there would be significant
differences in the characteristics of the two, and their
possible uses at sea. Important conclusions were: 1) The
best results occured on the DOT 7.5, although five Type II
'RECOGNITION' errors were noted; 2) As period of roll and
angle of roll were increased in cpm's and degrees
respectfully, results were poorer; 3) Identification
threshold settings were allowed to be set too low at +0. 60
by the CRT lock manager, and should be raised to
approximately +0. 70. That way, the probability of the
occurance of Type II errors (false
RECOGNITIONS/VERIFICATIONS) would be greatly decreased; 4)
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I. INTRODUCTION
The control of access to computer systems and other
vital equipment is becoming increasingly important as they
are entrusted with more sensitive applications and more
valuable information. Much emphasis has been placed in
increasing the accessibility of this equipment in order to
accommodate the user and to enhance his ability to interact
with it. This has posed new threats to system security and
has emphasized the need for more adequate safeguards against
unauthorized access ( FIPS Pub 48, 1977, p. 7). Aboard
present Naval and Coast Guard vessels
,
passwords, cipher
combinations, armed Marine guards for access to surface Navy
nuclear propulsion spaces, I.D. cards etc. are the
safeguards utilized to protect this equipment and space.
Should there be more of the same or should government direct
future planning towards replacing some of these basic
methods with newer technology.
There are three methods by which a person's identity may
be established: 1. something a person KNOWS like a password
2. something that he POSSESSES like an identification
photograph, I.D. card etc. and 3. something physically ABOUT
that person such as height, weight, and fingerprints.
Others include hand geometry, voice patterns, finger length,
and blood vessel patterns posterior to the retina.
Although weight can be useful in identifying someone, it
is not as reliable as other physiological traits because the
individual has the ability to change it through gain or
loss. An unchanging unique identifier that no two subjects
can identically possess, is most reliable when it comes to
'ABSOLUTE identification'. This compared to VERIFICATION of
non-physiological items like passwords that are SUPPLIED by
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the subject attempting to gain access. Because of the
vulnerability that the first two methods of identification
have to threats such as theft and duplication, much emphasis
is presently being focused on the technology of personal
identification through physiological and morphological
attributes( Rennick , 1975). Morphology is the study of the
form and structure of an organism or any of its parts.
Method three utilizes this technology.
The scope of this thesis was to determine if the
installation of retinal biometric devices to assist in
protecting vital areas is feasible in a shipboard
environment. Two models of the Eye Dentify 7. 5 retinal
scanner by Eye Dentify Inc. Beaverton, Oregon were utilized
during experimentation. See Figure 1. 1 to view the DAISY
7. 5 retinal scanner. Figures 2. 2 and 2. 3 display the newer
version DOT 7. 5 that has recessed eyeports. A transverse
motion simulator with variable speeds and angle of roll up
to fourteen degrees was used to simulate vessel motion.
Figure 1.1 Eye Dentify Inc. DAISY 7.5 Scanner
II. THE EXPERIMENT
A. EQUIPMENT
The Eye-dentify machine is based on the concept of
biometrics, the application of mathematical-statistical
theory to biology. The 7. 5 scanner utilizes the retinal
patterns of humans as the unique identifier. This identifier
is needed to disseminate between subjects trying to gain
access to a security area via the 7. 5. A study by Dr.
Carleton SIMON and Dr. Isadore GOLDSTEIN concluded that,
the spatial patterns exhibited by the internal blood
vessels of the human eye are a highly stable , highly
deterministic source of biometric information.
(Goldstein, Simon, 1935)
Through the efforts of Dr. Paul Tower(1955), these prior
findings were enhanced by his study that showed that the
greatest dissimilarities between monozygotic( identical
)
twins, was in the retinal blood vessel patterns.
The hardware components for the two 7.5's include a
binocular eyepiece for the DAISY and a recessed
monocular( right eye) eyeport for the DOT. This difference
is the only one between these scanners. Other components are
LED display, cast aluminum housing, 12 digit keypad(0-9, #
*), SCAN button, internal 68000 microcomputer chip and
electronic camera. The weight of a 7.5 is approximately 26
pounds. External to the scanner is a system compatible
terminal for I/O interface. A printer option was available
through an auxiliary port. A 640K(RAM) microcomputer was
used to 'download' data to floppy disk as a 'backup' or
'upload' to the 7.5.
The Eye-dentify 7. 5 has internal software that controls
the system's operation, and operation of external devices
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and IBANK storage for the signature templates corresponding
to those human eye patterns that have been enrolled.
1. ICAM Camera
The I CAM( camera) scans/illuminates a fovea centered
circle, on the inside posterior section of the eye which
includes the retina and choroid. The retina, continuous with
the optic nerve, is that part of the eye that receives the
image produced by the crystalline lens. The optic nerve
conducts impulses from the retina to the brain. The choroid
is a delicate, highly vascular layer that is continuous with
the iris( color surrounding the pupil) and lies between the
sclera(part of the dense external covering of the eyeball)
and the retina( Webster ' s Die, 1984). The scanned circle has
a 0. 8 degree radius and its size, expressed as an external
field half angle, is ten degrees. Infrared light is the
medium used in illumination. The amount emitted is
equivalent to the portion of infrared contained in the
natural light shining from the bulb in a refrigerator. This
same infrared is also found in home smoke alarms and VCR
remote controls.
The light that is reflected off the blood vessels,
retina and choroid, is passed through a photo sensor. It is
then scattered and 320 12-bit measurements are captured
along a 450 degree, (450/360= 1.25 rotation), camera lens
scan. An analog waveform is developed and then digitized via
an A/D( analog-digital ) converter. The digital signal is then
sent to the microcomputer chip for processing and then
stored in IBANK memory as a 320 bit eye signature in PIN
verification mode. See Figure 2. 1 for an illustration of
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EEPROM or bubble memory
EYE SIGNATURE - composite of live ID signals acquired during
enrollment process. Each eye (left and right) is packed into
40 bytes (320 bits) for storage in the Ibank
ICAM - acquires and digitizes the identification pattern from
the subject's eye
IBANK - Storage of all Eye Signatures (reference templates)
PIN - Personal Identification Number. Used in Verify mode to
select specific Eye Signature for match
MODE SWITCH - Selects the mode of the 7.5. Enroll mode allows
a new individual to be added to the Ibank. Verify compares
a live eye with the Eye Signature designated by the PIN
entry. Recognition automatically selects best Eye Signature
from the Ibank
Figure 2.1 System Flow Diagram, Extrac. ( Eye-Dentify 7.5,1984)
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In verification mode with 1200 eye patterns on file,
verification would take about 1.5(15/10) seconds. Of this
time, six tenths(6/10) of a second is for rotational delay
as the ICAM spins the 450 degrees( 1. 25 rotations) required
in the scanning process. The remaining nine tenths (9/10) of
a second is for processing bits in the microprocessor that
are associated with the specific eye signature that is being
compared to the 'live eye' just scanned. With recognition
mode, the time required for individual processing depends on
the number of templates in memory. With fifty templates,
response time is approximately two seconds.
2. Recognition Eye Signature Data Structure
The eye signature data structure for recognition
mode is 72 bytes (576 bits). Forty(40) bytes are used for
verification purposes, thirty two(32) for recognition. The
reason for this diversification is SPEED OF RESPONSE.
Whenever scanning in recognition mode, whether there are
fifty or twelve hundred templates in bubble memory, the five
closest templates to the 'live eye' scanned are chosen for
further comparisons. An algorithm based on fourier cross
correlation is used on the (32 byte) recognize templates.
This allows for the fastest possible selection of the five
most similar templates. The corresponding time is actually
less than 50 milliseconds for a sample of 100 subjects in
bubble memory. (Eye Dent letter, Jan 86) Next, verification
mode procedures are implemented on the chosen five to select
the best template match for the live eye. The first
verification that exceeds the threshold requirements is the
eye that is considered recognized. The match is then
displayed in the LED window and on a printer if connected.
This explains why it takes longer to get a response when
scanning in the recognition mode. Time for the fast fourier
analysis plus the time for 5 verifications. If this method
was not available, EACH template in bubble memory would have
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to be compared via verification methodology against the
'live' eye pattern. This would take an impractical amount of
time. For example, with 200 subjects in memory and no
fourier analysis, it would take ((9/10 sec/template) *( 200
templates)= 3 minutes, and this would only be processing
time.
B. THE MOVING PLATFORM
A moving platform was constructed to test how both the
DOT and DAISY Eye-Dentify 7. 5 would perform in a seaway.
Transverse roll would be measured with the use of a
protractor mounted horizontally and a plumb line hanging
vertically. The platform was designed to roll only in one
dimension due to money, time and material constraints.
Therefore, this would eliminate the other sensations of
motion that any individual riding aboard a vessel at sea
would encounter. These would be YAW, angular motion about
the vertical axis, and PITCH, fore and aft rotation about
the Center of Floatation lateral axis. The testing would be
done at rolls of seven degrees and fourteen degrees. These
were chosen as being representative of common sea states.
The mechanical constructs of the platform, and the output
power of the electrical motor used to generate motion,
hampered testing at angles greater than this.
The time(sec) from port to starboard to port was also
varied on the moving platform. This to model the periodicity
of waves as they pass under the hull of a ship and the
resultant cycle times ,also known as Period of Roll that
occur. (Naval Ships Technical Manual 079 VOL.1 -Stability and
Buoyancy, 1983) The height of a wave at sea, and also its
length in feet from crest to crest will have an effect on a
ship's "ride". To capture this phenomenon, a permanently
lubricated ZERO-MAX variable drive attached to a three
14
quarter horsepower, sixty hertz, 1725 rpm electric motor was
used. This variable drive was rated to deliver a maximum of
100 inch-pounds of torque to its output shaft. A 10:
1
reduction gear was connected to this output shaft to create
the desired shaft rotation needed to rotate the 10. 25 inch
diameter drive wheel that the 19. 5 inch drive arm was
attached to. This drive arm, that was connected to the
platform, required lubrication with graphite bearing grease.
Although this was the case, there were two instances where
bolts used to connect the drive rod to the drive wheel did
fail under load.
To insure that all measurements which dealt with cycle
time were noted under a constant regimen, a benchmark scale
located atop the ZERO-MAX was utilized. This scale had
values ranging from zero to six. With the use of a hand
wheel that adjusted the ZERO-MAX, a setting within this
range could be established. Simply, a direct relationship
between the benchmark setting and the cycle time(sec)
occured. The higher the setting, the faster the cycle time.
If set at a value of 6, the cycle time in seconds was very
small meaning the moving platform would "snap" back and
forth from port to starboard. For experimentation purposes,
Eye-Dentify 7. 5 scans using both DOT and DAISY machines were
taken at benchmark values of 1. and 1. 5. These settings
gave respective cycle times of approximately 10 seconds and
20 seconds. The first value representative of a turbulent
sea state with rough seas, the second a more moderate
,
gentle sea state.
The platform was mounted inside a rectangular base used
for structural strength. Two plywood mounting braces were
installed on either side of the moving platform. One was
used as a safety step for students to mount and dismount the
platform, the other as a mount for the motor, variable drive
and reduction gear. The platform was hex bolt pinned forward
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and aft, to the rectangular base. It was about these points,
that the platform would rotate transversely. Subjects were
allowed to mount and dismount only from the right side. This
way they would have no interaction with any of the
mechanical devices. A chair was mounted centrally on the
plywood platform base. Initially, the subjects were to be
tested in the standing position, but this proved to be
unrealistic. At faster cycle times, they were unable to
safely maintain their balance. Also, in the standing
position, their weight would be distributed at a higher
center of gravity thereby putting undue loads on the slip
belt of the variable drive, which inevitably might have lead
to a mechanical failure. See Figure 2.2 below and 2.3 on
the following page for visual description of the platform
and the DOT 7. 5 scanner.
Figure 2. 2 The Transverse Motion Simulator-Side
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Figure 2. 3 The Transverse Motion Simulator-Rear
A seatbelt was required at all times when data
collection was undertaken for safety considerations. The 7.
5
was mounted at a height of 40. 5 inches above the platform in
compliance with prior guidelines determined at the Sandia
National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, in June 1985
( Maxwell, undated) . This height allowed the least amount of
stooping when eye scanning in the sitting position. The
system operator controlled the electric motor via a remote
switch, and would instruct each person in the operation of
both the DAISY and DOT 7. 5 prior to starting the motor.
Because each subject had been through an earlier explanation
during initial template enrollment , this second explanation
only had to be done once, saving much time.
Connected to the auxiliary port of the Eye-Dentify was
an Okidata u93 serial printer. Output displayed on the
printer was subject's PIN( personal identification
number ), identification code, which can be any letter or
number , whether the person (was/was not)
VERIFIED/RECOGNIZED, correlation score and the date. The LED
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display of either machine will show up to eight of these
characters.
C. THE OBJECTIVE
The objective of this experiment was to compute Type I
and Type II error rates when subjects were tested under
dynamic conditions created when the transverse motion
simulator was used. The recognition and verification
thresholds would be held constant at +0. 60. Results from an
earlier test that used the Range Test on Means method
(Helle,1985) indicated, little difference in findings
between the lowest possible setting of +0. 60 and the
midpoint setting of +0. 72. Therefore, +0. 60 was chosen to
ascertain how each retinal biometric scanner would perform
under the least stringent threshold setting.
This would be the first occurance of a dynamic test on
any Eye-Dentify 7. 5. All earlier tests were static. As
experimentation proceeded, results showed an unusually large
occurance of Type II errors with the DOT 7.5, especially in
VERIFICATION mode to specific individuals. Therefore, an
additional objective was included, to determine if the
accuracy of this biometric scanner was worse than
advertised.
The research dealt with the possible use of these
scanners aboard Coast Guard and Naval vessels in a variety
of applications, such as radio and crypto spaces. Other
significant potential uses at sea are access to computers
and their systems, the CMS ( communication security material
system) vault, supply office cash vault, the entrance to
nuclear engineering spaces, and activation of a weapon
launch. Also possible is communication equipment control and
security, including authentication and recognition.
Additional military applications might include strategic and
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tactical command control, security for, or part of the
nuclear missile launch sequence at our silos.
An added plus, was the availability of the newer version
DOT 7. 5 scanner to the system operator. Not only could the
question of how motion affects the system be investigated,
but an additional objective of comparing ease of use,
accuracy, and the number of Type I and Type II errors that
occur between the DOT and DAISY be scrutinized. These
objectives were made as specific as possible to create an
atmosphere of simplicity, thoroughness and accuracy.
D. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE
Sixteen subjects were chosen at random from a total of
approximately sixty students that were enrolled in the same
MAN-MACHINE INTERACTION course at the Naval Postgraduate
School. Taking this specific course did not unfairly
prepare any of these students for the extensive
experimentation that was to follow. Three females and
thirteen males( 14 military, 2 civilian) were chosen with the
use of a random number generator. Their ages ranged from a
high of 51 to a low of 27. Those that wore contacts were
allowed to wear them during the analysis, while glasses were
not. They hampered some subjects during scanning. None of
the sixteen stated that they were totally or partially color
blind. During the initial enrollment process, all sixty
OS3404 class members, became the template database. There
were instances where students not involved with the motion
testing exhibited either slight color blindness or chronic
stigmatism, which caused trouble when trying to enroll them
into the DAISY 7.5. This was not the case with the DOT 7.5.
None of the sixty had ever used either 7. 5 system before.
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1. The Enrollment Process
To implement the enrollment process, a system
compatible CRT (Cathode Ray Tube) was required to be
connected via ribbon cable to the terminal port of the 7. 5.
Assuming power has been secured to the system, the operator
had to first gain access to the software main menu. This was
done by scanning his own eye. This allows access because the
system operator was listed under CRT lock management,
another name for database management. After this step,
enrollment may be initiated by typing E with a carriage
return. When enrolling a person, they must be directed to
concentrate because very low correlation scores will occur
if instructions are not followed. Below are the guidelines
to follow when enrolling ONLY on the DAISY wheel scanner:
1. Square the head up to the binocular eye ports.
2. Look into the eye ports and concentrate only on the
center of the daisy design to the upper left. Ignore
the second one you see to the lower right. The left
eye port is blanked off and it slides left and right
to provide a comfortable fit. Keep both eyes open.
3. Move your head about, until all red is removed from
view with only the greenish-white daisy design
remaining. This is where the majority of problems
occured with subjects who were slightly color blind to
greens or reds.
4. Press the SCAN button on the front of the machine very
gently. Erroneous data can occur by moving the machine
when pressing too hard if it is not permanently
mounted.
The following are guidelines implemented when enrolling ONLY
on the DOT scanner:
1. Square the head up to the machine and place forehead
on headrest. Notice there are no binocular eye ports,
only one recessed eye port for the right eye. The
white line adjacent to this eye port is to be used
optionally to align the center of the right pupil to
the center of the eye port.
2. Once on the headrest, do not move the head up or down,
only to the left or right when you have the beam of
light in view. You will perceive depth that you did
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not sense when using the DAISY. Place the 3 dots of
light that appear atop one another in a vertical line.
One dot will now appear. Place it in the center of the
outer semi-circular ring. For some, the dot will look
as if it is the apex of a three dimensional cone. The
act of fixating on this dot or the center of the daisy
pattern in the older version 7. 5 centers the scan
circle on the fovea. This is the part of the retina
that corresponds to the center of vision.
Press the SCAN button gently, as with the DAISY. It is
also located in the same position mentioned earlier.
When the SCAN button is depressed, the I CAM camera
is activated and a template is created and stored in memory.
After the first scan, a message will display on the CRT. At
this point the system operator has three choices:
1. Finish enrollment and identify PIN (personal
identification number) with a code.
2. Restart the Enrollment Process -
retaining only the previous retinal scan as the
beginning of a new reference template. All
previous eye signatures accumulated during the
enrollment session are erased. This function is
useful when previous correlation scores have been
low and the enroller wishes to restart the
enrollment process. ( Eye-Dentification Inc., 1985)
3. Cancel the current session altogether.
To acquire OPTIMUM memory templates, user manual
procedure required the enroller to take at least 5 eye scans
where the average correlation score of the entire five was
+0. 90. These correlation scores appear automatically on the
CRT display terminal and they can be ignored or averaged
with the person's template stored in memory. All sixteen
subjects associated with the moving experiment not only met
this requirement but were able to be enrolled with accepted
correlation scores never below +0.90, so any average of the
five scans taken would be well above +0. 90. A correlation
score is the mathematical representation computed by the
68000 microprocessor that defines how similar that live eye
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scan just processed is to the person's most recent template
in Ibank memory.
2. Factors Tested
When testing began using the transverse motion
simulator, the sixteen subjects were told to report during
announced times. They would have to report eight separate
times with at least a one hour delay between tests, for
learning curve purposes. The commencement date was 08
November 1985 with completion of all phases of the
experiment occuring on 27 November 1985. Both the drive arm
linkage, DAISY and DOT machines had to be changed and
adjusted manually for the duration of the experiment, which
is one reason for such an expanded time frame. The drive arm
procedure in particular, was considerably time consuming.
On the drive wheel, were drilled 7/16 inch threaded holes
outward from its center in the form of an arc, through which
the connecting 7/16 inch bolt would pass through. Here, the
drive wheel and drive arm were attached. The bolt would have
to be moved to a new hole along the arc, whenever a change
in angle of roll was required in the analysis. Criteria for
experimentation required the machines to be scrutinized
under the same conditions, chosen on a random basis. These
FACTORS are listed below:
1. DAISY Scanner
2. DOT Scanner
3. Angle of roll 7 degrees
4. Angle of roll 14 degrees
5. Cycle time of 10 seconds corresponding to a setting of
1. 5 on ZERO-MAX scale.
6. Cycle time of 20 seconds corresponding to a setting of
1. on ZERO-MAX scale
A successful recognize was represented by a Y(YES)
in the system operator's log sheet. For this to happen, a
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subject would have to receive a correlation score equal to
+0. 60 or higher with their personal identification number
(PIN) and identification code correctly identified. If the
statement NOT RECOGNIZED were to appear, it would mean their
correlation score was lower than +0. 60. In this instance, no
PIN or identification code is printed, only the correlation
score and date appear. As noted earlier, if this were to
successively happen three times, the warning SEE SECURITY
SEE SECURITY SEE SECURITY would flash in red letters on
the digital display on the face of either 7. 5 machine.
Inclusive with this is an audible alarm that would sound for
a pre-programmed duration. This sound and L. E. D warning
announced the occurance of a TYPE I ERROR, as the individual
was attempting to be RECOGNIZED/VERIFIED.
3. Hypothesis Type I. Errors
Formally, the HYPOTHESIS for this Type I error
analysis is: the subject attempting entry IS located within
IBANK memory. This hypothesis is true, but if the hypothesis
is true and it is REJECTED, an error has been committed
known as Type I error ( Freund | Williams, 1982, p. 316). The
system would NOT allow the individual to gain access, when
it SHOULD have. When a Type I error did occur, a notation
was made in the log sheet using the symbol N for NO.
At each session, all sixteen subjects were required
to complete six trials. One trial is defined as receiving
either a Y or N. Two sessions of six trials would have to be
finished before the subject was considered done in reference
to testing under a specific FACTOR. It was the system
operator's responsibility to randomly assign cycle per
minute settings of either 6.0 cpm or 3.0 cpm as the subject
was being tested in the motion simulator. An example to
provide clarity follows.
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On day one, subject 0037 reports at 1100am to be
tested using the DAISY scanner at a roll of 14 degrees.
Before energizing the electric motor, the system operator
sets the handwheel atop the variable drive to correspond to
a cycle time of 10 seconds. Six trials are to be taken, so
the first three trials are noted with the cycles per
minute( cpm) at 6. 0( ( 60sec/min) *( lcycle/10 sec)). The second
three trials are taken with a 3.0 cpm. The system operator
was able to vary CPM settings as the platform rotated. This
way the student would not be distracted and physically
jolted by a constant starting and stopping of the motor.
Initially, many students were inquisitive concerning
when they should depress the SCAN button when testing on the
transverse motion simulator. Common sense would tell them to
do this at either a roll of zero degrees or at the extreme
port or starboard angle of roll. It was at these positions,
that upright attitude for the former and relative motion for
the latter , create the most comfortable atmosphere. All
sixteen who participated, were instructed to depress the
SCAN button whenever they felt at ease in doing so, ensuring
that data would be collected in a RANDOM manner. From the
onset, there was never a problem with retaining totally
random roll positions that 7. 5 scans were taken at. As time
progressed, their apprehension was alleviated, because with
repetition, they saw how easy it was to scan at any angle.
The format of the four log sheets maintained by the
system operator consisted of two columns used to annotate a
Y or N score. The left column for data entries corresponding
to a shipboard period of roll of TEN seconds and the right a
period of roll of TWENTY seconds. The six separate testing
FACTORS (DOT, DAISY, roll=7, roll=14, cycle time 10 sec,
cycle time 20 sec) made up the log sheets and are noted in
the following list.
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1. Log sheet 1: Using the DAISY ICAM at seven degree roll
2. Log sheet 2: Using the DAISY ICAM at a fourteen degree
roil
3. Log sheet 3: Using the DOT ICAM at a seven degree roll
4. Log sheet 4: Using the DOT ICAM at a fourteen degree
roll
As mentioned previously, all scans were taken in the
RECOGNITION mode, where that scan would have to be matched
against all 576 bit( 72 byte templates):
either stored in the EEPROM (electrically eraseable
programmable read only memory chip) for twenty or less
enrollees, or BUBBLE MEMORY with a capacity of up to
twelve hundred enrollees. (Eye-dent, 1985)
While the VERIFICATION mode provides greater security than
the RECOGNITION mode because both an eye scan and a PIN must
be correctly accepted by the machine, it was not included.
VERIFICATION requires personnel to MEMORIZE and physically
KEY-IN their personal identification number(PIN) to the
twelve digit keypad on the face of 7. 5. This defeated the
purpose of investigating a system that does not require the
use of a memory code or password. One of the directions that
this thesis was determined to take was analyzing this very
principle. ONLY THROUGH THE RECOGNIZE MODE COULD THIS BE
ACCOMPLISHED.
E. THE RESULTS
NOT RECOGNIZED percentages were computed by counting all
scans taken by either the DOT or DAISY scanner at the
appropriate angle of roll. This number was then divided into
the number of correlation scores that were +0. 59 and lower.
These percentages are listed in Table 1 . The newly
introduced DOT 7. 5 clearly shows in its data that when used,
queue time drops significantly when compared to the DAISY.
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For example, at fourteen degrees inclination, only 13 out of
202 DOT scans( 6. 44%)were logged as NOT RECOGNIZED (which
means that scan was unacceptable), while 66 out of 251
scans( 26. 29%) was the corresponding percentage for the
DAISY. Additionally, for BOTH machines, as the angle of
roll increased, the higher the ratio of NOT RECOGNIZED to
TOTAL scans . This implies increased queue time, the greater
the sea state. Figure 2. 4 is a column chart, with NOT
RECOGNIZED percentages for the DAISY 7.5 and the DOT 7.5 on
the y axis versus angle of roll in degrees on the x axis.
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No* Recognized
Dot Overall = 5 3615
Daisy Overall = 24.1%
7 14
Angle of Roll Degrees
Figure 2. 4 Not Recognized Percentages
AVERAGE CORRELATION SCORES for RECOGNIZED PIN 1 s were
computed by summing correlation scores( +0. 60 and higher),
from the appropriate serial printer log sheet and dividing
by the number of successful recognized scans. This for a
particular Eye-Dentify and its requisite testing criteria.
This data is noted in Table 2 ^ DOT 7.5 scores for seven




DAISY 7 DEGREES: 58 NOT RECOGNIZED OUT OF TOTAL
OF 251 SCANS 58/251= .2310 = 23.
DAISY 14 DEGREES: 66 NOT RECOGNIZED OUT OF
TOTAL OF 251 SCANS 66/251= .2629 = 26.29%
DOT 7 DEGREES: 9 NOT RECOGNIZED OUT OF TOTAL
OF 208 SCANS 9/208= . 04326 = 4. 326%
DOT 14 DEGREES: 13 NOT RECOGNIZED OUT OF TOTAL
OF 202 SCANS. 13/202= . 06435 = 6. 435%
DAISY OVERALL: 124 NOT RECOGNIZED OUT OF TOTAL
OF 502 SCANS 124/502=. 2470 = 24.70%
DOT OVERALL: 22 NOT RECOGNIZED OUT OF TOTAL
OF 410 SCANS 22/410=. 0536 = 5. 36%
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plateau, (+0.912, +0.906 respectively) easily surpassing the
maximum allowable RECOGNITION threshold setting of +0. 85.
The system operator might want to implement this
setting( +0. 85 ) for maximum security requirements. The DAISY
7.5 was in the low "eighties", ( +0. 823 , +0. 802 ) respectively
and would not have met this limit. It is noteworthy to
realize that these are only AVERAGES, nonetheless this
comparison between the two machines does imply a definite
trend that they have differing performance characteristics.
Both DOT and DAISY machines had AVERAGE correlation
scores for NOT RECOGNIZED scans in the same range of (+0.41
+0.44). Figure 2.5 is a column chart of average
CORRELATION scores for the DAISY 7.5 and DOT 7.5 on the y
























ED Dot 7 5
E3 Daisy 7 5
7° overall - Sb9
14° overall = .855
7 14
Angle of Roll Degrees




DAISY 7 DEGREES: AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR
RECOGNIZED WAS 159.21/193= +.8249
AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR NOT RECOGNIZED WAS
25. 68/58=. 4427
DAISY 14 DEGREES: AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR
RECOGNIZED WAS 148.37/185= +.8020
AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR NOT RECOGNIZED WAS
29. 51/66=. 4471
DOT 7 DEGREES: AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR
RECOGNIZED WAS 181.51/199= +.91211
AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR NOT RECOGNIZED WAS
3. 73/9 =. 4144
DOT 14 DEGREES: AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR
RECOGNIZED WAS 171.37/189= +.90671
AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR NOT RECOGNIZED WAS
5. 75/13=. 4423
AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR 7 DEGREES WAS
340. 72/392= +0. 8692
AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR 14 DEGREES WAS
319. 74/374= +0. 8549
AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR CPM OF 3.0= +0.8508
AVE CORRELATION SCORE FOR CPM OF 6. 0= +0. 8377
DAISY OVERALL AVE CORR. SCORE 307. 58/378= +0. 8137
DOT OVERALL AVE CORR. SCORE 352.88/388= +0.9095
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As stated earlier, a trial was complete when either a
Y(yes) for a RECOGNIZED eye scan was logged or a N(no) which
represented a TYPE I error( three successive NOT RECOGNIZED
eye scans) was noted. A binomial distribution was expected
concerning the data dealing with these trials, where the
number of trials was fixed, the probability of a success was
the same for each trial, and that the trials were all
independent ( Freund | Williams, 1982). The trial results
collected on each subject were logged in groupings of six,
and each had a particular cycle per minute speed setting,
angle of roll and 7. 5 machine associated with it. Data
points could then be found by solving for the ratio of
Y(yes) trials in the numerator divided by 6 total trials in
that grouping. Three proportions were noted. They were
(6/6)= 1.00, (5/6)= 0.833 and (4/6)= 0.666. There were a
total of 128=( 768 trials/6) separate data points. The
mathematical transformation formula y= 2arcsine( sqrt( x) ) was
used to stabilize the variance in the data (Winer, 1971). To
utilize this equation, the values 0. 666, 0. 833 and 1. 00 had
to be converted to radians. These radian values were
3.1416(pi), 2.3006 and 1.9106 respectively, and were entered
as (x) in the transformation formula. A level of
significance of 0. 05 was selected when using F tables.
A four way analysis of variance( AOV) done by a computer
AOV 'package' was implemented on the data. The results are
listed in Table 3 .
The analysis showed that the effect of both A( angle of
roll) (F= 5.7870, DF= 1,15) and Su x Sp x A ( F= 2.8070, DF=
15,15) were the most significant relationships measured.
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TABLE 3
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE/EYE-DENT I FY 7.5 RECOGNITION RATE
SOURCE DF SS MS= F= F ratio
SS/DF SS/MS | err from tables
Su( Subjects) 15
Sp( Speed )cpm 1
A( Angle) 1
M( Machine) 1
Su x Sp 15
Su x A 15
Su x M 15
Sp x A 1
Sp x M 1
A x M 1
Su x Sp x A 15
Su x Sp x M 15
Sp x A x M 1
Su x A x M 15
1. 1877 0. 0792
0. 0012 0. 0012
0.2309 0.2309
0. 1101 0. 1101
1.3376 0.0892
0. 7543 0. 0503
0. 8750 0. 0583
0. 0130 0. 0130
0.0012 0.0012
0.0335 0.0335
1. 6793 0. 1120
0. 9839 0. 0656
0.0336 0.0336
0. 5979 0. 0399
1. 9850 2. 40
0. 0301 4. 54
5. 7870 4. 54 *sig*
2. 7594 4. 54
2. 2356 2. 40
1. 2607 2. 40
1. 4612 2. 40
0. 3258 4. 54
0. 0301 4. 54
•
0. 8396 4. 54
2. 8070 2. 40 *sig*
1. 6441 2. 40
0. 8421 4. 54
1. 0000 2. 40
ERROR
TOTAL
15 0. 5979 0. 0399
127 8.4371




1. Type I. Errors
The listing shown in Table 4 and Table 5 gives the
breakdown of Type I errors that occured, given a particular
Eye-Dentify machine, cycle per minute rate( represented by
ZERO-MAX settings of either 1. or 1.5) and angle of roll.
The numerator of the fraction, contains the number of false
rejections( three NOT RECOGNIZED scans sequentially by the
same person) and the denominator, the total scans attempted
by the individual under these criteria.
The four column charts that follow Table 4 and Table
5, display Type I error results. Figure 3. 1 charts the
NUMBER of Type I errors on the y axis versus DOT and DAISY
scanners on the x axis. Figure 3.2 charts the NUMBER of Type
I errors on the y axis versus the period of roll in cycles
per minute on the x axis. Figure 3. 3 charts the NUMBER of
Type I errors on the y axis versus the angle of roll in
degrees on the x axis. Figure 3.4 charts the Type I error
PERCENTAGE for this experiment only, on the y axis versus
the corresponding DOT and DAISY scanner on the x axis.
The overall Type I error rate was thirteen errors
out of a total of 768 trials or 1. 69%. Brochures from the
Eye-Dentify company( 1985 ) state that, "the chance of a false
rejection( Type I error) is AS LOW AS 0.1% dependent on the
system threshold setting and proper use." (Eye-Dentify
Inc. , 1985) No formal experiment was published which
indicates that this probability was tested (Helle, 1985). A
company spokesman did elaborate though, that this value
could be achieved under ideal conditions , consisting of
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TABLE 4
TYPE I ERROR RATES
14 DEGREE ROLL
DOT SCANNER
Cycle/Min rate --3. 6.0
TY. I ERROR/TRIALS












1/96= 1. 04% 1/96= 1. 04%
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TABLE 5
BREAKDOWN OF TYPE I ERRORS
**TOTAL NUMBER OF TYPE I ERRORS (N)= 13**
DAISY TYPE I error = 9 out of 13
DOT TYPE I error = 4 out of 13
14 DEG ROLL TYPE I = 10 out of 13
7 DEG ROLL TYPE 1=3 out of 13
CYCLE TIME 10 sec = 7 out of 13
CYCLE TIME 20 sec = 6 out of 13
768(96*8) TRIALS LOGGED DURING TESTING
OVERALL TYPE I FAILURE =13/768=. 0169=1. 69J
OVERALL SUCCESS =1-. 0169=. 9830= 98.30%
DAISY TYPE I ERR% = 9/(768/2)= 2.34%
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Figure 3.4 Retinal Scanner Type I Error (Percentage)
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excellent enrollments and proper scanning procedures. Since
this test measured the accuracy of both DAISY and DOT
machines at the lowest possible RECOGNITION threshold
setting of +0. 60, increasing the setting would increase the
Type I error rate. Proper use of the machines and the strict
following of user instructions is an extremly important
aspect to consider when discussing/dissecting these results.
The enrollment procedure and concentration by the subject
being scanned, are just a few variables that can effect the
outcome.
The most substantial relationship discovered in the
transformation variance computations was that of increasing
the angle of roll on the transverse motion simulator. The
computed F ( SS/MS error) was 5.7870. The value from the F
tables( level of significance = 0.05) was 4.54. Ten of
thirteen( 10/13 ) Type I errors occured when roll was
increased from seven to fourteen degrees. While other
relationships were not as significant as this, (i.e., no
significance surfaced when examining the variance analysis),
certain outcomes should be noted. Fifty percent (8/16) of
the subjects tested did not have any occurance of Type I
errors. Of the remaining eight subjects that had Type I
errors, 4 of the 8 had 69.2% of the errors.
The newer version machine(DOT) had fewer Type I
errors (4/13) than the DAISY, which might be attributed to
the fact that fifteen out of sixteen subjects preferred
using the DOT 7.5, feeling more confident when using it. One
felt that with his poor eyesight, "it was difficult to
distinguish the daisy pattern, yet could line up quite
easily the blurry cone with the three green dots. " Those
that are color blind to greens and reds will have problems
with the DAISY 7.5, but they will function with the DOT
where depth perception and not color is important. The one
subject, PIN(0038) that preferred the DAISY, had three of
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the total thirteen Type I errors(23%). Two of those three
occured on the DOT. The remaining fifteen subjects liked the
three dimensional cone/dot depth alignment system on the DOT
over the two dimensional plane view of the greenish-white
daisy wheel provided on the DAISY.
For health reasons, it would seem wise to utilize
the recessed eye port construction of the DOT because the
eye does not come in contact with anything. The forehead is
placed on the headrest. With the DAISY, the eyeball and
possible tears have a greater chance of coming in contact
with the rubber protection guards, promoting the possible
spread of a virus or germs to others. Overall Non-
Recognition percentages for DOT were (5.36%) and (24.70%)
for DAISY. This implies, a person using the DAISY 7. 5 is
inevitably going to have to scan many more times to gain the
same amount of acceptances allowed through the use of a DOT
7. 5.
Slightly more Type I errors occured (7 out of 13),
when the 'period of roll 1 was increased implying that in
heavy seas, the machine's performance could be downgraded
because of problems with keeping the head still. A solution
to this might be to shape a curved recess into the forehead
rest of the DOT 7.5, to allow one's forehead to fit within
it for greater stability in rough seas. The DAISY does not
allow this option, due to its outwardly radiated eyeport
construction. One student stated however, that resting the
sockets of the eye on the rubber guards atop these eyeports
does help keep the head still. Installing handles close to
both machines would aid in stabilizing oneself in a
shipboard environment.
In every instance but one a logical outcome appeared
as the factors were adjusted when testing the machines
aboard the transverse motion simulator. All results were
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poorer as angle of roll was increased, period of roll(sec)
was increased and when the older DAISY 7. 5 was used. An
example of this, noted earlier( Table 2), would be the large
difference between the machines when comparing OVERALL
average RECOGNIZED correlation scores. DOT = +0.9095, DAISY
= +0.8137, the difference being +0.0958. The one exception
to this logic was the occurance of five (Type II)
RECOGNITION false acceptances ONLY on the DOT 7.5. This
exception is discussed in the following text.
2. Tvoe II Errors
Type II errors did occur in both the RECOGNIZE and
VERIFY modes. Formally, the HYPOTHESIS for this Type II
analysis can be stated : the subject attempting entry IS
located in Ibank memory and wants to be identified by
matching his/her own personal identification number (PIN) OR
BY MATCHING ANY OTHER AVAILABLE PIN in Ibank memory to gain
access. This hypothesis is of course FALSE because the
machine is designed to accept subjects only against their
own PIN. If this FALSE hypothesis is ACCEPTED by the
machine as TRUE, an error has occured. This is known as a
TYPE II error ( Freund| Williams, 1982, p. 316). In 'laymens'
terms, someone is allowed access (false identification and
acceptance) by the 7.5. Although the subject was located in
Ibank memory, he SHOULD NOT have been recognized/verified
under ANOTHER subject's PIN.
In strict probabilistic terms, Type II errors can
mathematically happen, but are not expected to occur,
because
every person, even an identical twin , has a widely
divergent
, unalterable retinal eye pattern. The
chance of false acceptance in the VERIFICATION mode is
0. 0001%( one in a million), with the phase correction on
(normal operation). The correlation coefficient being
+0. 70. The purpose of the software implemented phase
corrector is to compensate for eye rotation about the
visual axis. This eye rotation is the result of tilting
the subject s head with relation to his/her orientation
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during the enrollment process. (Oregon
and Industry, 'White Paper' , 1984)
Museum of Science
The corresponding odds of a false acceptance( Verification
mode) with the correlation coefficient set at the minimum
+ 0. 60, is approximately one in sixteen- thousand five hundred
and two( 1/16,502) or +0.00606%. This minimum setting( +0. 60)
was used throughout the experiment. The odds were derived
from studies at the OREGON MUSEUM OF SCIENCE AND INDUSTRY in
Portland, Oregon 10 October 1984. The odds represented here
is the result of a revision to their findings by the Eye
Dentify company. Originally their report had stated these
odds were one in forty five thousand( 1/45, 000) or 0.00222%.
The probability of a Type II error is hard to fixate
in the RECOGNITION mode because it depends on the population
size in bubble memory and the correlation threshold setting
that is assigned by the system manager. For example, the
LOWEST security provided would occur with the correlation
threshold set at +0.60 in the RECOGNIZE mode and 1200( the
maximum) individuals stored in bubble memory. As memory
population increases from 0000 to
1200( 0000,0001,0002, ... 1200) , the greater the odds that a
Type II error may occur because more eye patterns are
available to be compared/matched against. This dilemma does
not lend itself to VERIFICATION mode, because this method
requires the entering of the personal identification number.
A one to one eye template match is then attempted.
Therefore, an INDIRECT relationship between this coefficient
and the occurance of Type II error is documented. The
smaller the identification threshold coefficient, the
greater the probability of a false acceptance. With Type I
errors, the reverse is true; ( DIRECT relationship). The
larger the threshold coefficient, the greater the odds that
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false rejections will occur because the administrator is
'tightening' security.
In the initial motion experiment, utilizing the
sixteen students, one male (personal identification number
0060) was falsely recognized under another male's code; (PIN
0025). The DOT 7.5 was used in this instance. NO false
RECOGNITIONS were EVER noted during the motion experiment
using the DAISY 7. 5. Neither male had difficulties during
the enrollment process, with the exception of a machine
"lock-up" that required the system operator to re-start the
enrollment process with PIN 0060. A "lock-up" connotes that
keyboard commands and 'carriage returns' are not accepted by
the Eye-Dentify software. To alleviate the situation, power
was secured and re-energized, and the entire process
reinitiated. To insure that possible bad templates were not
located in IBANK memory under PIN 0060, all IBANK records
were listed and checked. None were found in memory for this
particular male. No difficulties were encountered during the
second enrollment of PIN 0060. It is extremly important to
grasp that the ONE false RECOGNITION occuring on 8 November
1985, was related to PIN 0060' s SECOND ENROLLMENT AND NOT
HIS DELETED FIRST .
The correlation score associated with this specific
Type II error was +0.67. He was being tested with the angle
of roll set at a maximum of fourteen degrees, and cycle per
minute values of 3. and 6. 0. At all sessions, as noted
earlier, six trials were taken. He was successfully
recognized the first three scans, FALSELY on the
fourth( cpm=3. 0) and successfully on the latter two. The
72-byte 'recognize' signature templates of the matched
males, were separated by a margin of (0060-0025 = 35) PIN
positions in bubble memory.
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On the same day, a female( 0067 ) was falsely
RECOGNIZED, three successive times with scores of +0.61,
+ 0.60, +0.63 under the PIN of another female( 0063 ) . These
were initially considered questionable because 0067 had some
difficulties enrolling. She DID meet the requirements of the
enrollment process stated in the user's manual. Many
enrollment scans had to be rejected via a N0(N) response to
the question OK TO AVERAGE? shown on the cathode ray
terminal, because they were not at least +0.90. The system
operator was eventually able to acquire five scans above
+0. 90 in reasonable time. A decision to re-enroll was made
however, to try to attain better eye templates. The former
scans were ignored and deleted from the system operator's
log and IBANK memory respectively when she enrolled a second
time very easily. The log was later recalled as a record
that the three scores were legitimate Type II errors. This
due to additional 'VERIFICATION' false acceptances between
PIN 0067 and 0063 in later trials, that implied a probable
similarity between the eye patterns of these two female
subjects. No additional false recognitions were logged with
this particular female or any other person related to the
transverse motion simulator test up to this point.
A decision was made to change over to VERIFICATION
mode on 25 NOV 1985 and test ONLY four specific individuals.
Those two subjects ( 0060, 0067 ) that had Type II recognition
errors occur in the motion test, along with the two other
subjects( 0025, 0063 ) that they had been matched up against by
the DOT 7. 5. This strategy included a second enrollment of
all four individuals. This time existing templates would NOT
be erased. Now all four would have two separate templates
in bubble memory. Of these four, only one (0060) had both a
Type I error and a false RECOGNITION Type II) occur during
testing.
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The system operator programmed the DOT 7. 5 for
verification parameters and then tested whether a false
match might be achieved by scanning the eyes of one person
against the two eye patterns of their match stored in IBANK
memory. To do this, the four digit PIN of the person trying
to be matched was entered in the numeric keypad of the Eye-
dentify machine. The purpose of re-enrolling, was to double
the chances of noting false verifications and to
ELIMINATE/REDUCE the probability that system operator error
was responsible for the THREE false RECOGNITIONS between
PIN(0067) and PIN(0063) and the ONE false RECOGNITION
between PIN 0060 and PIN 0025 reported earlier. This, in
addition to the coincidence that the only occuring
software/hardware "keyboard lock-up" on 8 November 1985
happened to that same individual, namely 0060. Males only
tested against males, females only tested against females.
Testing under these circumstances, provided the results
noted in Table 6 .
For Table 6, MALE 1(0060) is represented by
PIN' s( 0060,0069). MALE 2(0025) is represented by
PIN' s( 0025,0071). FEMALE 1(0063) is represented by
PIN" s( 0063,0070). FEMALE 2(0067) is represented by PIN's
(0067,0072). The first PIN (O, ) is the older enrollment,
and the second PIN ( ,N)the newer.
On 25 NOV 1985, a false VERIFICATION was recorded
with a correlation score of +0. 64. The significance of this
particular scan, was that it was the first time one had
occured against a NEWLY enrolled PIN. Many more were to
follow; (See Table 6). These new PINs, with their
corresponding 40 byte 'verification' templates in IBANK
memory, were created under the most carefully scrutinized
enrollment procedures. The thesis advisor witnessed the
routine followed. The occurance of this particular Type II
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DOT TABLE (6) TYPE II ERRORS- VERIFICATION ONLY
0060- MALE 1, trying to match MALE 2, (old PIN 0025, new
PIN 0071)
false verification scores: . 60 .65 .61 .63 .64 .64-(0025)
.67 .60 .64 .65 .64 .65
.63 .64 .67 (0071)
15/58 = 25. 86% 15 scans out of 58 were false
verifications.
0025- MALE 2, trying to match MALE 1, (old PIN 0060, new
PIN 0069) .62 (0060)
false verification scores of : . 64 .60 .62 .63 .65 -(0069)
. 62
7/44= 15. 91% 7 scans out of 44 were false verifications.
0063- FEMALE 1, trying to match FEMALE 2, (old PIN 0067,
new PIN 0072)
false verification scores of: 1( . 60) 4(.61) 5(.62) 2(.63)
4(.64) 1(.65) ..--(0067)
5(.60) 3(.61) 2(.62) 6( . 63 ) 2( . 64) 3(.65) 1( . 66) --( 0072 )
39/59 = 66. 10% 39 scans out of 59 were false
verifications.
0067-FEMALE 2, trying to match FEMALE 1, (old PIN 0063,
new PIN 0070)
NONE (0063)
false verification scores of: .61 .63 .61 (0070)
3/11= 27. 28% 3 scans out of 11 were false verifications.
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VERIFICATION error seemed to eliminate improper enrollment
procedures as a cause for all the false acceptances. Also
on that same date, a FIFTH Type II error under the RECOGNIZE
mode happened when on the fifth of six trials, PIN 0060 was
again incorrectly recognized as PIN 0025, with a correlation
score of +0. 63. ALL FIVE TYPE II RECOGNITION ERRORS OCCURED
ON THE DOT 2-5 , with the motion simulator activated.
Initially, these tests had not been performed on the
DAISY 7. 5 because NO false recognitions occured during
normally scheduled simulator motion testing. Upon request
from the Eye-Dentify company of Beaverton Oregon, identical
experimentation was completed on the DAISY scanner. The
reason they were requesting this continuation of testing,
was to determine if the numerous Type II verification errors
that were consistently occuring to these four subjects, only
on the DOT 7. 5 along with five false recognitions, were
caused by a defective camera. Internal feedback from the
DOT's hardware or software was also considered. This might
have created poor enrollment templates.
If identical FALSE recognitions/ verifications on
the DAISY scanner were to prevail, this might disprove their
theory, or at least make them test much more extensively.
CROSS TALK, a coding system used by the company on all their
machines was found to be correct in the DOT machine. The
value was +0.044, which was stenciled in its internal
cabinet. This number matched the value displayed on the
terminal monitor when the command (Control-K) was input
along with a password when at the main menu listing on the
monitor. The cross talk value for the DAISY was +0.060, but
no value was found stenciled inside the cabinet to compare
with.
All four subjects were enrolled a second time on 27
NOV 1985 into DAISY 7. 5 bubble memory. The same requirement
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of keeping the older templates in memory in addition to
these newly created ones was followed. The VERIFY threshold
was at +0. 60, a constant that did not change throughout all
testing. Cross checking of the two males and two females was
completed in the same manner that prevailed with the DOT
7. 5. There was no reason to cross check male to female,
because no connection was evident. Out of curiosity, a few
female to male cross checks were attempted. Resultant
correlation scores were well below +0. 45( +0. 00 - +0.45).
Testing under male/male, female/female conditions, provided
the results listed in Table 7.
For Table 7, MALE 1(0060) is represented by
PIN' s( 0060,0028). MALE 2(0025) is represented by
PIN 1 s( 0025,0072). FEMALE 1(0063) is represented byPIN's
(0063,0071). FEMALE 2(0056) is represented by PIN's
(0056,0070). The first PIN (O, ) is the older enrollment,
the second PIN ( ,N) the newer.
Male subject 0060 was scanned more than any
other, three hundred and thirty eight(338) instances, because
of consistent scores in the "fifties" (+0.50 - +0.59). At
one point, the system operator turned off all the lights in
the laboratory to see if that would assist 0060 in getting a
false verification by matching 0025. Although it did seem to
help when focusing in on the daisy wheel pattern, there were
no pronounced changes in correlation scores. Additionally,
the day before 0060 had 'enrolled' his second time, the PIN
being 0072. He was able to correctly identify against this
NEW PIN of his quite easily, but was unable to match when
verifying against his own OLD PIN 0060 created two weeks
earlier. The attempts were made over a two hour time
duration. Apparently the night before 0060 received only 5. 5
hours of sleep and stated he had been tired all day. The
following morning, 0060 repeated the same procedure after a
normal nights sleep and was identified against his OLD PIN
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DAISY TABLE(7) TYPE II ERRORS- VERIFICATION ONLY
0060- MALE 1 trying to match MALE 2, (old PIN 0025,
new PIN 0072)
false verification scores: .60 — (0025) NONE (0072)
1/338= 0.29% 1 scan out of 338 was a false verification.
128 out of the 338 (37.87%) scans cross referencing
PIN 0060 against PIN 0025 had scores in the range of
(.50 -.59). The ave. was +0.534. There were in this
range for the eleven scans cross referenced against new
PIN 0072. The average correlation score for the new PIN
was +0.32, with two highs of +0.49.
0025- MALE 2 trying to match MALE 1, (old PIN 0060,
new PIN 0028)
false verification scores: NONE (0060)(0028)
0/28 = 0. 00% scans out of 28 were false verification
The highest correlation score was +0. 53 occuring once.
0063-FEMALE 1 trying to match FEMALE 2, (old PIN 0056,
new PIN 0070)
false verification scores: .61 (0056)
.60 (0070)
2/25 =8% 2 scans out of 25 were false verifications.
There was a gap of four NOT VERIFIED scans,
before the second Type II error was recorded.
She also had 3 scans in the "fifties".
0056- FEMALE 2 trying to match FEMALE 1, (old PIN 0063,
new PIN 0071)
false verification scores: NONE (0063)(0071)
0/31=0% Zero scans out of 31 were false verifications.
Her highest correlation score was +0. 31.
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with consistent scores in the nineties( +0. 90 - +0.99). This
implies a possible connection between FATIGUE and being
acknowledged by the Eye-dentify 7. 5.
There were FIVE misRECOGNITIONS (Type II) out of
934(0.535%) recognition scans for this
experiment! • 67, . 63 , . 63 , . 61, . 60 ) on the DOT 7.5. There were
SIXTY- FOUR misVERIFICATIONS (Type II) out of a total of 172
verification attempts utilizing the DOT 7. 5 which computes
to 37.21%. There were THREE misVERIFICATIONS (Type II) out
of a total of 422 verification attempts utilizing the DAISY
7. 5 which computes to 0. 71%. There were NO misRECOGNITIONS
on the DAISY. One can see that there was a great disparity
in the number of false VERIFICATIONS( Type II) on the DAISY
7.5 (3.) versus the DOT 7.5 (64) , when cross checking
between the four subjects. Those three (3 out of 422) imply
quite a lot though. If none had occured, then one might have
surmised that the reason for so many false verifications on
the DOT 7.5 was defective hardware/software (and/or) that
the particular machine was possibly a 'lemon'.
Another reason might be that the DOT may create more
accurate/defined signature templates, because the three
dimensional dot/cone alignment method seems to have proven
its superiority over the two dimensional daisy pattern. The
proof being earlier listed results. This allows subjects to
enroll under better conditions. When cross checking is done
in VERIFICATION mode, one on one, the different templates
relating to the paired individuals have a greater likelihood
of matching up. Although few in number, the occurance of
those THREE false VERIFICATIONS on the DAISY implied that
there WERE eye pattern similarities between these four
specific individuals. Two of the three matches occured in
the female/female link. One on the old PIN 0056, one on the
new PIN 0070. The remaining misverification obviously
related to the male/male matching, and was tied to the old
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PIN 0025. Future research could investigate whether
subjects of the same sex have a greater chance of matching
up against one another.
It must be noted that no other Type II
RECOGNITION/VERIFICATION errors have occured on these
particular machines from APR 1985 to the present. The
machines have been in the Man-Machine Laboratory( Root Hall
107) Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California,
undergoing testing on a continuing basis. If the number(5)
of Type II RECOGNITION errors were evaluated over the entire
timeframe that the DOT 7.5 has been tested at the USNPGS,
the Type II false recognition rate would be significantly
lower. All rates presented in this work are a result of this
specific thesis experiment only.
B. OTHER OCCURANCES/FORMULATIONS
The highest correlation score relating to the verify and
rdcognize Type II errors of this experiment was +0.67.
Raising the lower identification threshold limit that the
CRT lock manager sets, from the present +0. 60, to possibly
+0. 70 WOULD INSURE THAT THESE FALSE ACCEPTANCES WOULD HAVE
NEVER HAPPENED (±0.20 > ±0.62). A spokesman from Eye-
dentify Inc. stated that they were in the process of
revising their policy of not allowing the correlation
threshold to ever be set below +0. 71 for this reason. A
negative aspect of this policy would be increased queue time
because correctly RECOGNIZED/VERIFIED scores in the +0. 60-
+0. 70 range would now be treated as unacceptable( NOT
RECOGNIZED) by the 7.5, requiring additional eye scans that
take more time.
A theory was formulated after consultation with Eye-
dentify Inc. that dealt with enrollment procedures. It was
thought that accepting only very high enrollment correlation
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scores( +0. 90 - +0.99) might have a negative effect on the
digitized waveform that is processed and stored as the
signature template. This waveform is created from reflected
light generated from the beam of the ultra-low infrared
light during the scanning process. This theorized negative
effect was mentioned as a possible cause of recurring Type
II errors. In response, all sixty original enrollees were
entered into the system under the same stringent conditions
of accepting only enrollment scans in the 'nineties'. This
policy MET the requirements of the user's manual: "that the
five enrollment scans taken should average at least +0. 90. "
No deviations were ever allowed.
In addition, the swapping of template data located in
the bubble memories of the DOT and DAISY was considered.
This to assist in determining the cause of the Type II
errors 'only' occuring on the DOT 7.5. Refer to Table 7 for
DAISY Type II error figures i.e., (3 out of 422). The
procedure was to 'download' the eye templates from DOT
bubble memory to floppy disk using the ' BACK IB BASIC '
language program and then 'upload' to DAISY bubble memory.
Tests would be run and then the procedure reversed. The four
subjects would try to get false acceptances in both modes.
It was never done because in the interim, the three false
verifications( +0. 61, +0. 60, +0. 60) occured on the DAISY. This
enhanced the belief that some similarities between eye
patterns were evident and that the identification threshold
coefficient would have to be permanently raised to decrease
the probability of recurrent Type II errors.
A floppy disk that stored the hexadecimal values of the
eye pattern templates belonging to the four (Type II) error
subjects was forwarded to the Eye-Dentify Co., Oregon. They
were able to investigate and compare signatures to the
bit( binary digit-0,1) level, to ascertain how similar the
eye patterns actually were. Verbal reports to the thesis
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The cost of the Eye-dentify 7. 5 retinal biometric
scanner is $10,000.00 as of January 1986. No other firm
manufactures such a product and the U. S. military does not
own or maintain this type of device aboard ship. They are
now being tested by research facilities like the Naval
Postgraduate School for possible future uses by the
Department of Defense. Because there is a lack of
competition presently between manufacturers, its price is
relatively expensive. As more competitors join this market
though, a lower equilibrium price should eventually be
attained for retinal scanner hardware. The software needed
for a shipboard computer system interface would depend on
the size of the application required. No specific price is
available, because retinal scanner applications have not
been developed for shipboard use. As technology is
developed though, and as all retinal biometry applications
are perfected, this price should decrease also. Numerous
examples of products from the computer and electronics
industry can be cited to support this claim. The most
profound is the advent of microcomputers. When the LISA
business office system was first introduced by Apple
Computer Inc. of Cupertino, California, the price was
$10,000.00. In a very short time prices were drastically
cut(more than a third). This was due to intense competition
and a lack of market interest in the LISA. Eventually it was
discontinued as a production item.
As Research and Development R+D) costs are distributed
by increasing competition and amortized over increased sales
revenue in retinal scanners, the unit cost of each machine
should decrease, making the system increasingly affordable
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and attractive. The U. S. Government is usually the first
buyer of this type of equipment in large amounts. This
allows the private sector to study its successes/failures
through government use before they have to buy in any
quantity.
1. Applications
Some obvious applications aboard ship would be
security and access control. An example mentioned earlier,
would be to locate a retinal scanner at the main entrance to
the nuclear propulsion space on either an aircraft
carrier( CVN) , surface combatant( CGN) or a
submarine( SSN/SSBN) . The scanner would have its own battery
backup for emergency power generation should there be a loss
of the ship's electrical load. If it was decided that the
scanner alone would not provide adequate security, a
password system or cipher lock could be used in parallel
with the scanner. This 'double protection' system has more
distinct advantages than a cipher lock or password system
alone. A disadvantage to consider is the additional time
required to successfully gain access to a system guarded
with 'double protection'.
2. Shortcomings
Cipher lock combinations can be compromised, as can
passwords, I.D's etc. Human retina, choroid and blood
vessel patterns are not, as long as the database manager( CRT
lock) is honest and proficient. This manager(s) is the only
person(s) with the capability to circumvent via the
manipulation of parameters, or by enrolling someone that
does not have authorization. The key difference is, with
passwords everyone with access must MEMORIZE it, thereby
having the ability to give the password to someone else.
With retinal scanning, although you may have access, you
cannot give someone else your eye signature template stored
away in bubble memory.
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Common shortcomings of passwords regarding the
security of a computer system , especially with the advent
of 'hackers', is the ability to control the dissemination of
the password and the need to constantly change it. The use
of retinal identification alleviates this need because the
scanner operates as a secure stand alone system and can also
be installed as a network of units reporting to a host
computer. ( Eye-Dentify, 1985) It could be used to simplify
the logon procedure for a computer user. Instead of typing
the user ID and access code, the user simply scans and gets
logged on automatically.
Certain systems needing enhanced security might only
require a retinal scanner by itself, while others may need
double protection provided through 'paralleling'. Another
option to consider if 'paralleling' is not feasible, is the
use of one machine in the dual eye mode, i. e.
,
(one subject
scanning BOTH left and right eyes simultaneously). The DAISY
has this option, the DOT does not. Also, two machines can
be modified so that the correct identification of two
DIFFERENT subjects is necessary to allow access. This
technology would be ideal for two person control of very
sensitive functions. Envision two separate 7.5's to be used
by watch officers in a missile silo to scan in sequence
before their system could be activated.
In June of 1981, Columbia Broadcast System(CBS) news
aired a multi-faceted evening documentary titled, The
Defense of the United States . In one episode, viewers were
given the chance to explore the realm of a watch station in
a nuclear missile silo. The officers on duty had certain
procedures to be followed should they ever receive the order
from the President, to follow through with what they were
trained to do. It would seem reasonable that, with the use
of a retinal scanner in parallel with existing activation
procedures, this would enhance security. This would occur
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because there would be a reduction in the probability that
an imposter or crazed watchstander could successfully breach
all authentication procedures( now to include a retinal
scanner), gain access and launch.
To estimate the total cost of this specific piece of
HARDWARE and needed peripherals for a 600 ship Navy and
selected Coast Guard vessels is beyond the scope of this
thesis. Some ships would require more retinal scanners
because the equipment they store and the information they
process warrants it. Large amounts of secure information are
handled, high level communication and computer equipment
must be guarded, nuclear spaces protected etc. , therefore
more scanners are needed. Fewer scanners need to be
installed where the mission of the vessel does not include
the storage/dissemination of VAST amounts of high level
secure information, equipment or computers.
A ship classification hierarchy based on security
requirements would need to be developed to determine how
many scanners each would be allocated. Possible groupings
would include: all nuclear powered combatants and
conventional aircraft carriers( CVN, CV, SSN, SSBN, CGN)
,
conventionally powered combatants large(CG,DD) and
small(DDG,FF,FFG) , the auxiliary force( AO, AOE, AFS, AOR, AE )
.
Others are the amphibious force large( LHA, LPH, LKA) and
small( LST,LSD,LPD) , command and control( LCC,MSC)
battleships( BB) and support tenders (AD,AR,AS). Coast Guard
cutter groupings would be High Endurance Cutter s( WHEC)
Medium Endurance Cutter s( WMEC) and Icebreakers( WAGB)
.
Additional costs would include needed maintenance
beyond contracted warranty. Also application software costs




In general, the use of this device is ONLY acceptable
when the physical security of the space will preclude access
via any other means. Cost is always a consideration. It
would appear a fairly minor one in this instance, given the
sensitive data, information and equipment a scanner would
assist in protecting. This opinion is enhanced by the
recent spying cases under investigation throughout the
United States Navy and other government agencies. A recent
Navy spy case involves a Navy civilian counterintelligence
analyst, and his wife. He for allegedly spying for our ally
Israel, and his wife charged with relaying top secret data
to Red China. Non-Navy employees arrested include a man who
was convicted of selling CIA information to Chinese
intelligence agents for more than thirty years. Another man
is charged with delivery and attempting to deliver national
defense documents to an adversary. One document was a
transcript of a hearing of the House Armed Services
Committee classified as top secret.
The need for enhanced security is understandable. It
must be noted though, that with retinal biometrics along
with the other biometric devices( fingerprint, palmprint,
finger length etc. ), the human element is still relied upon.
Human systems cannot be considered infallible when a CRT
database administrator is capable of being careless or
dishonest when enrolling individuals. Money can still be
used as a bribe to circumvent the system. With this system
though, fewer individuals have access to controls which
could make a difference.
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A. USES ABOARD SHIP
In an area aboard ship requiring maximum security, with
a limited number of people requiring access IMMEDIATELY, the
retinal biometric measuring device would be ideal. It should
provide a more reliable method of identification than a
photograph, ID, cipher or password because it cannot be
compromised as readily. Its use could also be considered
aboard ship, where the total access list is small to medium
in number, immediate access is NOT so critical, and entry
times are STAGGERED to alleviate the chance of a queue
forming. During an alarm, certain individuals such as the
commanding officer might have to bypass, if possible, for
immediate access. The greater the number of subjects needing
access to a space or system in a shipboard application, the
greater the possibility that large queues might form. This
would be counterproductive.
Physical maintenance of the 7. 5 should not be a concern.
The system is compact, and capable of being mounted on a
table top or protruding from a bulkhead. It would be treated
like any other valuable electronic equipment; located within
the interior of the ship away from the elements, i.e.
,
salt/sea spray, extreme temperatures etc. . There would be a
need for software maintenance as updates are needed.
Although costs and benefits were discussed in the prior
chapter, it was not a comprehensive investigation, but only
a general overview. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to
dissect the subject any further. An entire thesis could be
dedicated to a cost/benefit analysis of installing retinal
biometric scanners aboard U. S. Navy ships and Coast Guard
cutters.
Retinal scanners should become commonplace in future
years. Individuals will want to know the long term effects
of exposure to the infrared light. Although Threshold Limit
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Testing(TLV) has shown the effect to be harmless, many will
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